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tions they are associated with.Abstract
In an e⁄ort to stimulate a more exciting and entertaining style of play, the National Hockey Associa-
tion (NHL) changed the rewards associated with the results of overtime games. Under the new rules,
teams tied at the end of regulation both receive a single point regardless of the outcome in overtime.
A team scoring in the sudden-death 5-minute overtime period would earn an additional point. Prior
to the rule change in the 1999-2000 season, the team losing in ovetime would receive no points while
the winning team earned 2 points. This paper presents a theoretical model to explain the e⁄ect
of the rule change on the strategy of play during both the overtime period and the regulation time
game. The results suggest that under the new overtime format equally powerful teams will play
more o⁄ensively in overtime resulting in more games decided by a sudden-death goal. The results
also suggest that while increasing the likelihood of attacking in overtime, the rule change would have
a perverse e⁄ect on the style of play during regulation by causing them to play conservatively for
the tie. Empirical data con￿rm the theoretical results. The paper also show that increasing the
rewards to a win in regulation time would not prevent teams from playing defensively during regular
time.
JEL Classi￿cation C72, L83
Keywords: Ice Hockey, Game Theory, NHL Overtime Rule.1 Introduction
Economic studies on the in￿ uence of rules, institutions and incentive structures on behavior are
complicated by the fact that incentives and observations on behavior are a⁄ected by a variety of
factors outside the relationship of interest. For this reason, environments which eliminate some of
these outside in￿ uences are of particular interest. Some recent studies have used observed data from
sporting competitions to assess the e⁄ects of incentives. Rule changes in sports provide a unique
natural experiment to test the consequences of theoretical payo⁄ structures. Similar rule changes
were recently introduced in professional ice hockey. For example, the performance of individual
competitors has been shown to increase directly with the level of rewards in the sports ranging from
bowling (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990) to auto racing (Maloney and Terkun, 2002). In terms
of team sports, Banerjee and Swinnen (2003) present a game theoretic model along with empirical
evidence that the introduction of a sudden death rule in soccer has led to more conservative play.
Despite the inherent attraction associated with the speed and action of ice hockey, the popularity
in North America of the game￿ s premier professional league, the National Hockey League (NHL),
lags behind that of the other three major professional sports leagues, the National Football League
(NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), and the National Basketball Association (NBA). The NHL
has attempted to increase the general appeal of the game by introducing several rule changes ranging
from tougher ￿ghting penalties to increasing the size of the area behind the nets. One of the most
signi￿cant changes was the introduction in the 1983-84 season of a 5 minute, sudden-death overtime
period to settle any regular season games that had ended in a tie. A team scoring in overtime would
receive 2 points for the win while the losing team got 0 points for the loss. Each team received a
single point if the game remained tied at the end of overtime. In an e⁄ort to combat the perceived
conservative play in overtime, the NHL implemented a new point structure in the 1999-2000 season.
Teams tied at the end of regulation would both receive a single point regardless of the outcome in
overtime. A team scoring in the sudden-death overtime would earn an additional point. While the
intent of the rule change was to increase the excitement of the game through a more attacking style
of play, the change in the reward system could have a perverse e⁄ect on the style of play.
The purpose of this paper is to determine the e⁄ect of changes in overtime rules on the play by
NHL teams during regulation time and in overtime. The paper begins with a game theoretic model
that determines optimal team strategies under alternative overtime point systems. The theoretical
results suggest that rule changes should result in more overtime games being decided within the
extra-time period but that more games will end up tied after the normal 60 minute regulation time.
Empirical results are then presented con￿rming the hypotheses in section 3. Implications of other
rule changes are assessed in the conclusions.
12 Payo⁄ Structures
The time points are de￿ned such that teams can score a maximum of one goal during each time
point.1 We begin by breaking the game involving teams A and B into an arbitrary set of T discrete
time points N = f1;:::;t;:::;Tg. For example, t may represent a minute of play in a hockey game.
Consider the game from the point of view of team A. At every t; the state of the game for team
A is described by the random state vector Xt; where
Xt =
8
> <
> :
1; if team A scores a goal, at time t,
0; if neither team scores a goal, at time t,
￿1; if team B scores a goal, at time t.
The probabilities of this random variable are given by
Pr(Xt = 1) = p; Pr(Xt = ￿1) = q and Pr(Xt = 0) = r = 1 ￿ p ￿ q:
The probability of team A scoring a goal is the same as the probability of team B conceding a goal.
This implies that the state vector of team B is ￿Xt: At every instant t there is a zero sum game
between A and B implying that both cannot score during the same time point. The probabilities p
and q are functions of the actions of the teams.
Each team decides before the start of each time point on their playing strategy. We assume
the strategies are de￿ned in terms of two actions, defensive play, denoted by L, and o⁄ensive play,
denoted by H. We de￿ne the actions sets of the two teams at a given moment t as SA
t and SB
t ;
where Si
t = fH;Lg; i = A;B:
The probability functions p and q are de￿ned as
p : S
A
t ￿ S
B
t ! [0;1]and q : S
A
t ￿ S
B
t ! [0;1]:
We assume that the probability of scoring is higher with o⁄ensive play; formally:
p(H;:) > p(L;:) and q (:;H) > q (:;L) (2.1)
The ex-ante strategy sets of the two teams for the entire game are SA and SB; where Si =
Y
t2N
Si
t
( i = A;B); a set consisting of all possible T￿tuple sequences of H and L: So an element of Siis the
vector s
ﬂ
i = (si
1;:::;si
t;:::;si
T); where si
t 2 Si
t:
3 Optimal Overtime Strategies
The framework de￿ned above is applied initially to the overtime period to determine how a changing
reward system a⁄ects play in overtime. Overtime is the 5 minute additional period NHL teams play
1In hockey, there are three stop-time periods of 20 minutes in a regulation game and a 5 minute sudden-death
overtime period if the game is tied after 60 minutes of regulation play.
2at the end of a regular season game when the score is tied. The game may end before completion of
the overtime period if a team scores a goal. The team that scores ￿rst in overtime wins the game.
Since its introduction to the NHL in 1982, the length of overtime and its sudden-death format have
remained unchanged. However, the rewards associated with overtime play were changed in the
1999-2000 season as described further below.
The sudden-death nature of overtime can be modeled as a stochastic process Wt de￿ned in terms
of a goal di⁄erence at time t. Initially, the goal di⁄erence is zero, W0 = 0. If team A (B) scores
during the next time interval, then Wt = 1 (Wt = ￿1) and team A (B) wins the game with no
chance for the other team to come back and score. The team with a positive goal di⁄erence is the
winner. Thus, Wt is similar to a random walk with absorbing barriers at 1 and ￿1: The transition
probabilities associated with this stochastic process are given by;
Pr(Wt = d
0jWt￿1 = d) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 if d0 = d 6= 0;
p if d0 = +1 and d = 0;
r if d0 = d = 0;
q if d0 = ￿1and d = 0;
0 otherwise.
with the initial condition of Pr(W0 = 0) = 1:
3.1 The old overtime rule
From the introduction of overtime to the NHL in 1982-1983 to the completion of the 1998-1999
season, the team scoring in overtime received two points for the win while the losing team received
none. Both teams earned a single point if nobody scored and the game was still tied after the
overtime period. We refer to this payo⁄ system as the ￿ old rule￿ .
We can de￿ne the incentive scheme UoldA
T for team A as,
Uold
A
T = I fWT > 0g ￿ I fWT < 0g (3.2)
where I f:g is the indicator function. Team B￿ s end of play payo⁄will be UoldB
T = ￿UoldA
T. If team
A at the end of the game has more goals than team B, then team A wins (receives 1) and otherwise
team B wins (team A gets -1). The teams get nothing when the goal di⁄erence is zero. Since the
strategies will only depend on the di⁄erences in payo⁄, this normalisation does not matter. The
expected payo⁄
E
￿
Uold
A
T
￿
= Pr(WT > 0) ￿ Pr(WT < 0);
under the old incentive scheme are derived for each team in Lemma 1 as2:
Lemma 1 Under the old rule, the expected payo⁄ of team A, V oldA
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= E
￿
UoldA
T
￿
, is:
T X
t=1
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿￿
p
￿
s
A
t ;s
B
t
￿
￿ q
￿
s
A
t ;s
B
t
￿￿
;
2Formal proofs of lemmas and theorems are in the appendix.
3and the expected payo⁄ for team B is
V old
B
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= ￿V old
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
where R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿￿t￿1
￿
=
Q
t2￿t￿1 r
￿
sA
t ;sB
t
￿
and ￿t￿1 = f1;:::;t ￿ 1g:
With the payo⁄ structures associated with the overtime point systems established above, we can
now de￿ne the strategies of play that will maximize a team￿ s expected payo⁄ (or minimize in the
case of team B). To derive the equilibrium strategy sequences, we assume that the teams involved
are equally likely to score under similar situations and similar styles of play. This is a reasonable
assumption given the fact that a game is more likely to go to extra times if the teams are of similar
qualities (a similar assumption is made by Palomino et al. (1999) and Banerjee and Swinnen (2003)).
Formally: teams A and B are de￿ned to be equally powerful if and only if
p
￿
s
A;s
B￿
= q
￿
s
B;s
A￿
(3.3)
for all
￿
sA;sB￿
2 SA ￿ SB:
Under the assumption of equality, using lemma (??) we have
V old
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= ￿V old
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
:
This implies if team A maximises (team B minimises) its expected payo⁄s a) the value of the game
is 0 (See Owen 1995, page 29) and b) at any equilibrium the teams will play similar sequences of
actions s
ﬂ
A = s
ﬂ
B = s
ﬂ
:
To see this, assume for a moment that there is only one period in a game. (This assumption is
purely for illustration and will be generalized later.) Let team A chose strategy, s
ﬂ
A and team B s
ﬂ
B:
Then with the assumptions of equality of teams the expected payo⁄ matrix (of Team A) under the
old rule is:
sB￿sA H L
H 0 ￿(p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H))
L p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H) 0
(3.4)
where the columns (rows) represent the possible strategy of team A (B):
From the above matrix if p(H;L) > p(L;H), then team A will not be better o⁄ deviating from
H if team B plays H: Therefore [H;H] is the equilibrium. If p(H;L) < p(L;H); then the last row
and the last column dominates and [L;L] is the equilibrium.
Denote p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H) = ￿: The equilibrium therefore depends on the sign of ￿: We refer
to the value of ￿ as the comparative advantage of team A. Team A has a comparative advantage in
playing o⁄ensive hockey if and only if
p(H;L) > p(L;H) (3.5)
A team has a comparative advantage in playing o⁄ensive hockey if the team is more likely to
score playing an o⁄ensive strategy against a defending team of equal quality compared to when it
4plays defensively against an equal quality team playing o⁄ensively. The previous analysis implies
that if team A has a comparative advantage in playing o⁄ensive (￿ > 0), then so would team B
because both are equal. Thus, playing o⁄ensive is the optimal strategy for both teams in all time
periods. This also holds for general T ￿ period strategies of the overtime game:
Theorem 1 Under the old rule and assuming the teams are of equal quality, if team A maximises
(team B minimises) its expected payo⁄, and:
a) if teams have a comparative advantage in playing o⁄ensive hockey (￿ > 0) then (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) is the
only equilibrium;
b) if ￿ < 0; then (L
ﬂ
;L
ﬂ
) is the only equilibrium,
c) and the value of the game is zero for all T,
where H
ﬂ
is a T￿vector of H0s and L
ﬂ
is a T-vector of L0s:
Theorem 1 implies that in equilibrium the optimal strategy sequences chosen by the teams depend
on whether the teams have a ￿comparative advantage￿in playing o⁄ensively or defensively. This is
the generalisation of the result of the one period game. In some sense it is even stronger as it holds
for any given T. This implies that even if the teams are given the freedom to change their style
of play as many times as they like, they will always chose the style which is consistent with their
comparative advantage.
3.2 The new overtime rule
In the 1999-2000 season, the NHL introduced a new reward system for overtime games. Under the
new rule (also called Rule 89), both teams receive one point if they draw in regulation regardless of
the overtime result. A team that wins the game in overtime gets an additional point, hence two in
total, as in the old rule. However, the team that loses in overtime still keeps its one point- unlike
the old overtime rule.
The new incentive scheme is no longer a zero sum game. If team A wins in overtime, team B
receives the same reward as if the game was tied. In terms of the notation de￿ned above, team A
receives 1 point and team B earns 0 points which is what both teams would get if the game remained
tied after overtime. Again, since the strategies will only depend on the di⁄erences in payo⁄, this
normalisation does not matter.
De￿ne the end of play payo⁄ UnewA
T of team A under the new rule as,
Unew
A
T = I fWT > 0g (3.6)
where I f:g is the indicator function.
Team B￿ s end of play payo⁄ will be
Unew
B
T = I fWT < 0g (3.7)
The payo⁄ structure with the new rule for overtime scoring is given in Lemma 2.
5Lemma 2 Under the new rule the expected payo⁄ of team A, V newA
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= E
￿
UnewA
T
￿
is:
T X
t=1
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿
p
￿
s
A
t ;s
B
t
￿
;
and the expected payo⁄ of team B, V newB
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= E
￿
UnewB
T
￿
, is:
T X
t=1
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿
q
￿
s
A
t ;s
B
t
￿
;
where R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿￿t￿1
￿
=
Q
t2￿t￿1 r
￿
sA
t ;sB
t
￿
and ￿t￿1 = f1;:::;t ￿ 1g:
The intended e⁄ect of the change in the overtime incentive scheme was to encourage o⁄ensive
play. To determine the e⁄ects, we evaluate it from the point of view of Team A. Since Team B￿ s
expected utility function is symmetric, it will behave the same way as team A.
With the payo⁄ structures associated with the overtime point systems established above, we
can now de￿ne the strategies of play that will maximize a team￿ s expected payo⁄. To derive the
equilibrium strategy sequences, we assume as in the old overtime game, that the teams involved are
equally likely to score under similar situations and similar styles of play (3.3). Note that this is not
a zero sum game anymore, for both teams the payo⁄s are always positive, which we shall denote in
a payo⁄ matrix as
￿
V newA
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
;V newB
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿￿
. But since the teams are similar, the teams
will play similar sequences of actions s
ﬂ
A = s
ﬂ
B = s
ﬂ
:
To see this, assume for a moment that there is only one period in a game. (Again this assumption
is purely for illustration and will be generalized later.). Let team A chose strategy, sA and team
B sB: Then with the assumption of equality of teams, the expected payo⁄ matrix (of Team A and
Team B) under the new rule is:
sB￿sA H L
H (p(H;H);p(H;H)) (p(L;H);p(H;L))
L (p(H;L);p(L;H)) (p(L;L);p(L;L))
(3.8)
where the columns (rows) represent the possible strategy of team A (B): From the above matrix since
p(H;H) > p(L;H) and p(H;H) > p(H;L) by (2.1), then team A will not be better o⁄ deviating
from H if team B plays H: Therefore [H;H] is the equilibrium. This result is true for any T ￿period
strategy:
Theorem 2 Under the new rule and assuming the teams are of equal quality, if team A maximises
(team B minimises) its expected payo⁄ and:
a) if teams have a comparative advantage in playing o⁄ensive hockey (￿ > 0) then (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) is the
equilibrium;
b) and limT!1 V newi
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) = 1
2, i=A,B.
where H
ﬂ
is a T￿vector of H0s:
6To illustrate the implication of Theorem 2, consider the case that team A has a comparative
advantage in playing defensive hockey (￿ < 0). Note that in (3.8) even if, p(H;L) < p(L;H);
[L;L] is not a equilibrium. Therefore even though the team has a comparative advantage in playing
defensively, it will not do so since playing o⁄ensively increases the expected payo⁄to the team. This
implies that even teams with a comparative advantage of playing defensive hockey (￿ < 0) will not
play defensively throughout the game. Thus, our model shows that the rule change will lead to an
increase in o⁄ensive play in overtime.
4 Impact on Regular Time Game Strategies
Changing the points awarded in overtime will not only a⁄ect the style of play in overtime but may
also have an e⁄ect on the play during the 60 minute regular time game. To show this, we de￿ne a
random variable Zt; as the goal di⁄erence between teams A and B from the perspective of team A at
time t: This stochastic process is a Markov chain (more precisely a random walk on integers) with
Zt = Zt￿1 + Xt;t = 1;:::;T and Z0 = 0: The transition probabilities of this stochastic process are
Pr(Zt = d
0jZt￿1 = d) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
p if d0 = d + 1
r if d0 = d
q if d0 = d ￿ 1
0 otherwise
: (4.9)
with the initial condition of Pr(Z0 = 0) = 1:
A winner is determined after the regular time period of T , if there is a positive goal di⁄erence.
If there is no goal di⁄erence, the game goes to overtime with the payo⁄ structures de￿ned in the
previous section. Therefore, we de￿ne the end of play payo⁄ UregA of team A as,
Ureg
A = I fZT > 0g ￿ I fZT < 0g + ￿I fZT = 0g
where I f:g is the indicator function and ￿ is the expected outcome from the extra time game. Since
the overtime game under the old rule was zero sum with a skew symmetric payo⁄ matrix, the value
of the game is zero (Theorem 1 part c)). Hence, under the old rule, ￿ = 0: Under the new rule, the
game is no longer a zero sum game, and the expected value of overtime is always positive, but the
exact value depends on the number of periods,-T the strategy has been considered. But as a limiting
case, i.e when T is large enough, ￿ = 1
2(Lemma 2 part b)).
Team B￿ s end of play payo⁄ will be
Ureg
B = I fZT < 0g ￿ I fZT > 0g + ￿I fZT = 0g
Recall that we assumed that a maximum of one goal can be scored in each period t and that
N = f1;:::;t;:::;T;g: De￿ne then T1 as the periods in which team A scores a goal, T2 as the
periods in which Team B scores a goal and T3 when neither scores. Therefore the probability that
team A scores at times t 2 T1 and team B scores (team A concedes a goal) at times t 2 T2; is
Pr(Xt2T1;Xt2T2;Xt2T3):
7Then jT1j is the number of goals scored by team A and jT2j is the number of goals scored by team
B. So if jT1j ￿ jT2j = d, team A wins by d goals. Notice that T1;T2 and T3; is an arbitrary partition
of N; so team A can win by d goals with any such partition as long asjT1j ￿ jT2j = d, therefore
summing over all such partitions will give us the probability of winning by d goals as,
Pr(ZT = d) =
X
T3;T1;T2:jT1j￿jT2j=d
Pr(Xt2T1;Xt2T2;Xt2T3):
We can then derive the expected payo⁄ of Team A,
E
￿
Ureg
A￿
=
T X
d=1
[Pr(ZT = d) ￿ Pr(ZT = ￿d)] + ￿Pr(ZT = 0)
and Team B,
E
￿
Ureg
B￿
=
T X
d=1
[Pr(ZT = d) ￿ Pr(ZT = ￿d)] + ￿Pr(ZT = 0)
as follows,
Lemma 3 In the regular game, the expected payo⁄ of team A, V A
T reg
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= E
￿
UregA￿
is:,
T X
d=1
X
T1;T2:jT1j￿jT2j=d
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
+ ￿
X
T1;T2:jT1j=jT2j
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿T3
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
;
and the expected payo⁄ of team B, V B
T reg
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
is:
￿
T X
d=1
X
T1;T2:jT1j￿jT2j=d
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
+ ￿
X
T1;T2:jT1j=jT2j
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
;
where T1;T2;T3 is a partition of N and
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
= P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
￿ Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
;
s.t P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿￿
￿
=
Q
t2￿ p
￿
sA
t ;sB
t
￿
; Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿￿
￿
=
Q
t2￿ q
￿
sA
t ;sB
t
￿
and R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿￿
￿
=
Q
t2￿ r
￿
sA
t ;sB
t
￿
:
Note that when the overtime game is under the old rule (i.e , ￿ = 0); the expected payo⁄ for
team B is
V
B
T reg
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= ￿V
A
T reg
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
:
An alternative way to compute Pr(ZT = d) is to use the Markov equations in (4.9), by de￿ning,
￿t;d
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= Pr(Zt = d):
8Then Pr(ZT = d); is the solution for the recursive system
￿t;d
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
=
p
￿
sA
t ;sB
t
￿
￿t￿1;d+1
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
+ q
￿
sA
t ;sB
t
￿
￿t￿1;d￿1
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
+r
￿
sA
t ;sB
t
￿
￿t￿1;d
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ (4.10)
￿0;0
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= 1 and ￿0;d
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= 0 for d 6= 0:
As before we assume that the teams which are playing are equally likely to score under similar
situations and similar styles of play (see equation (3)).
4.1 Under the old overtime rule
The extratime game under the old rule was zero sum with a skew symmetric payo⁄ matrix. The
value of the game is zero (Theorem 1 part c)). Hence under the old rule ￿ = 0: Therefore under the
assumption of equality, using lemma (3) we have
V reg
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
= ￿V reg
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
B;s
ﬂ
A￿
:
The payo⁄ matrix is skew-symmetric, which implies that under the old overtime rule if team A
maximises (team B minimises) their expected payo⁄s a) the value of the game is 0 (See Owen 1995,
page 29) and b) at any equilibrium the teams will play similar sequences of actions
ﬂ
sA = s
ﬂ
B = s
ﬂ
:
The simplest way of dividing the regular time game is to think of it in terms of three equal
periods. This makes intuitive sense as the regular time play is divided into three 20-minute (stop-
time) periods. The teams may chose di⁄erent strategies in each of the three periods. If team A
chooses strategy, s
ﬂ
A and team B s
ﬂ
B;the expected payo⁄ matrix in regular time for Team A (when T
= 3) is:
sB￿sA H;H;H H;H;L H;L;H L;H;H H;L;L L;H;L L;L;H L;L;L
H;H;H 0 ￿A ￿A ￿A ￿B ￿B ￿B ￿C
H;H;L ￿￿A 0 0 0 ￿D ￿D ￿E ￿F
H;L;H ￿￿A 0 0 0 ￿D ￿E ￿D ￿F
L;H;H ￿￿A 0 0 0 ￿E ￿D ￿D ￿F
H;L;L ￿￿B ￿￿D ￿￿D ￿￿E 0 0 0 ￿G
L;H;L ￿￿B ￿￿D ￿￿E ￿￿D 0 0 0 ￿G
L;L;H ￿￿B ￿￿E ￿￿D ￿￿D 0 0 0 ￿G
L;L;L ￿￿C ￿￿F ￿￿F ￿￿F ￿￿G ￿￿G ￿￿G 0
(4.11)
9where
A = (1 ￿ 2(1 ￿ p(H;H))p(H;H));
B = (1 + r(H;L)r(H;H));
C = (3r(H;L) + ￿
2 + 6p(H;L)p(L;H)));
D = (1 ￿ p(H;H)r(L;L) ￿ p(L;L));
E = (r(H;L) + ￿
2 + 2p(H;L)p(L;H)));
F = (1 + r(H;L)r(L;L));
G = (1 ￿ 2(1 ￿ p(L;L))p(L;L))
Note that A;B;C;D;E;F and G are positive numbers. Assuming there is no comparative advantage
to o⁄ensive play by the teams ( ￿ > 0), team A will not be better o⁄deviating from (H;H;H) if team
B plays (H;H;H) during regulation time. Therefore, [(H;H;H);(H;H;H)] is the equilibrium when
the old overtime (￿ = 0) incentive rule prevailed. If ￿ < 0; then the last row and the last column
dominates and [(L;L;L);(L;L;L)] is the equilibrium. This also holds for a general T ￿ period
strategy and the result is summarized in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 Under the old rule and assuming the teams are of equal quality, if team A maximises
(team B minimises) its expected payo⁄ in the regular time game and:
a) if teams have a comparative advantage in playing o⁄ensive hockey (￿ > 0) then (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) is the
only equilibrium;
b) if (￿ < 0), then (L
ﬂ
;L
ﬂ
) is the only equilibrium,
c) and the value of the game is zero for all T,
where H
ﬂ
is a n￿vector of H0s and L
ﬂ
is a T-vector of L0s:
Theorem 3 (proof: see appendix) implies that under the old overtime rule in equilibrium the
optimal regular time strategy sequences chosen by the teams depends on whether the teams have
a ￿comparative advantage￿in playing o⁄ensively or defensively. This is the generalisation of the
result for 3 periods as discussed above. This implies that even if the teams are given the freedom
to change their style of play as many times as they like, they will always chose the style which is
consistent with their comparative advantage, under the old rule.
4.2 Under the new overtime rule
The new overtime rule may have a perverse e⁄ect of the style of play during the regular time game.
Note that under the new rule, the game is no longer zero sum and the expected value of the overtime
is always positive. The exact value depends on the number of periods (T) but the strategy as a
limiting case, i.e when T is large enough, ￿ = 1
2(Lemma 2 part b)).
An important implication is that teams may no longer play o⁄ensive hockey even if they have a
comparative advantage in doing so. Formally, if the teams are equal (3.3) and have a comparative
10advantage in playing o⁄ensive hockey (3.5) (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) may not be an equilibrium for some teams unlike
under the old incentive regime. Consider the following example for the three period game (T = 3)
of two equal teams with a comparative advantage in o⁄ensive play.
Example 4 Let (p(H;H);p(H;L);p(L;H);p(L;L)) = (1
4; 1
12; 1
16; 1
20). Considering the in￿nitely
divisible overtime game under the new rule we have ￿ = 1
2: Note that the comparative advantage
of playing o⁄ensive hockey is ￿ = p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H) = 1
48 > 0: Using lemma (3) or the Markov
equations (4.10) we obtain the expected payo⁄ matrix of Team A and B as:
sB￿sA H,H,H H,H,L H,L,H L,H,H H,L,L L,H,L L,L,H L,L,L
H,H,H (0.16,0.16) (0.19,0.17) (0.19,0.17) (0.19,0.17) (0.25,0.19) (0.25,0.19) (0.25,0.19) (0.38,0.27)
H,H,L (0.17,0.19) (0.18,0.18) (0.22,0.22) (0.22,0.22) (0.24,0.21) (0.24,0.21) (0.34,0.31) (0.38,0.3)
H,L,H (0.17,0.19) (0.22,0.22) (0.18,0.18) (0.22,0.22) (0.24,0.21) (0.34,0.31) (0.24,0.21) (0.38,0.3)
L,H,H (0.17,0.19) (0.22,0.22) (0.22,0.22) (0.18,0.18) (0.34,0.31) (0.24,0.21) (0.24,0.21) (0.38,0.3)
H,L,L (0.19,0.25) (0.21,0.24) (0.21,0.24) (0.31,0.34) (0.23,0.23) (0.34,0.34) (0.34,0.34) (0.37,0.34)
L,H,L (0.19,0.25) (0.21,0.24) (0.31,0.34) (0.21,0.24) (0.34,0.34) (0.23,0.23) (0.34,0.34) (0.37,0.34)
L,L,H (0.19,0.25) (0.31,0.34) (0.21,0.24) (0.21,0.24) (0.34,0.34) (0.34,0.34) (0.23,0.23) (0.37,0.34)
L,L,L (0.27,0.38) (0.3,0.38) (0.3,0.38) (0.3,0.38) (0.34,0.37) (0.34,0.37) (0.34,0.37) (0.37,0.37)
Clearly Team A (or B) will not play (H;H;H) as deviating to (L;L;L) yields a better payo⁄. In
fact, in this example [(L;L;L);(L;L;L)] is the dominant strategy equlibrium.
This example shows that under the new rule some teams will not play attacking hockey even if
their comparative advantage lies in doing so. Thus, the change in incentive to create more attractive
play in overtime has the perverse e⁄ect of resulting in more conservative, defensive play in regulation
time.
This is rational behavior for players and coaches, because why risk losing a point by aggressively
pursuing a win in regulation if the safer route is to get a regulation tie and go for the extra point in
overtime? In short, with the current rules, you can lose a game but still get a point in the standings.
5 Empirical evidence
Data on the results of individual games for the last eight NHL seasons were collected from the website
http://www.hockeynut.com/archive.html. The number of regulation and overtime games played and
the results in the overtime games are summarized in Table 1 for the whole NHL and by conference
within the NHL in Table 2. The ￿rst four seasons represent the time when the losing team in
overtime game received no points while the last four seasons are when each team tied at the end of
regulation received a single point regardless of the outcome in overtime.
The results in Table 1 con￿rm the ￿rst theorem that teams take a more o⁄ensive approach in
overtime if both teams are guaranteed a single point going into the overtime. If a team could lose
a point by giving up a goal in the 5 minute overtime, teams would play a conservative strategy to
avoid losing what they had gained over the 60 minutes of regulation play. Under such a rule for the
111995-1996 season through the 1998-1999 season, over 70% of the games tied in regulation remained
tied after the 5 minute overtime (see Table 1). In contrast, overtime goals were scored in close to
50% of the games tied after regulation for the last four seasons under the rule change.
Table 1
It is important to note that the modi￿cation to the NHL overtime rule at the beginning of the
1999-2000 season not only changed the point system but also the number of skaters on the ice.
In order to further increase the possibility of scoring, the NHL went from the 5-on-5 play used in
regulation time to 4-on-4. Since both the point system and number of players for overtime were
changed at the same time, the e⁄ect of each on the signi￿cant increase in overtime wins cannot be
determined. However, Abrevaya (2002) gathered overtime results for the American Hockey League
(AHL) which is a minor league a¢ liate of the NHL. The two overtime rule changes were implemented
separately by the AHL. The data indicate that the awarding a single point in overtime was primarily
responsible for the increased number of overtime wins. Prior to the rule change, 68% of overtime
games remained tied and this dropped to 59% with the change in point system. The percentage
dropped slightly further to 55% with the introduction of 4-on-4 play. Thus, the scoring system
change has increased the likelihood of o⁄ensive strategy in overtime as desired.
The e⁄ects of the rule change on the probability of an overtime result were also assessed through
the use of a Logit model with the dependent variable de￿ned in terms of whether a team scored in
overtime (1=yes, 0=no (game remained tied)). The factors hypothesized to in￿ uence the chance of
scoring in overtime include the introduction of the rule change in the 1999-2000 which is proxied by
a dummy variable equal to 1 for seasons with the new point system and 0 for years prior to the 1999-
2000 season. Team payrolls were used to proxy the e⁄ect of absolute and relative o⁄ensive abilities by
teams. Player salary information was obtained from http://users.pullman.com/rodfort/SportsBusiness/BizFrame.htm
for the majority of the seasons and http://www.lcshockey.com/extra/1997/salary.asp for the 1997-98
years and http://www.lcshockey.com/extra/1998/salary.asp for the 1998-99 season. The sum of the
team payrolls is assumed to increase the likelihood of a goal scored in overtime since player salary is
generally directly related to o⁄ensive skills. The absolute value of the di⁄erence is also assumed to
increase the chance of the game being settled in overtime since there is a relative di⁄erence in the
comparative ability of the teams to play o⁄ensive hockey.
A dummy variable was included to capture the e⁄ects of games played between teams within the
same or di⁄erent conferences. The 30-team NHL is divided into two conferences of 15 teams (East
and West). The top 8 teams within each conference make the playo⁄s at the end of the 82 game
regular season. A team￿ s overall pro￿tability is determined in large part by the revenue earned
from ticket sales of home playo⁄ games. Thus, making the playo⁄s generates income but so does
￿nishing further up the league standings as the higher placed team earns home-ice advantage in any
playo⁄ series. Thus, incentives and correspondingly team strategy in overtime will vary depending
upon whether the opponent is from the same conference. Since relative positions determine playo⁄
ranking and potential home-ice advantage, teams within the same conference wish to avoid giving an
12additional point in overtime to their opponents. While teams from within the same conference could
gain from an additional point in overtime, the consequences of giving up a goal are signi￿cant. In
contrast, both teams have nothing to lose by attempting to score in overtime if they are in di⁄erent
conferences. Summary statistics presented in Table 2 con￿rm the hypothesis that an overtime goal is
more likely to be scored by if the teams are from di⁄erent conferences but the percentage di⁄erences
are not statistically signi￿cant.
Results of the Logit regression on the likelihood of a goal being scored in overtime are listed in
Table 3. The new overtime rule has signi￿cantly increased the likelihood of a goal being scored in
overtime as predicted by the model and supported by the summary statistics of Table 1. The only
other statistically signi￿cant variable was the sum of the salaries for the two teams involved in an
overtime game. As expected, high payroll teams are more likely to be involved in an overtime game
that results in a win for one team. The di⁄erence in salary between two team and the conference
e⁄ect had the expected signs but were not statistically signi￿cant.
The theoretical results suggested the overtime rule changes would not only a⁄ect strategy within
the overtime but also play during regulation. The ￿fth row of Table 2 indicates that slightly more
games of the total games played have gone into overtime with the change in point system. The
percentage of games ending in a tie after the 60 minute regulation time increased from 20.2% to
22.6% with the change in the payo⁄ structure. The increase is statistically signi￿cant.
Table 2
Table 3
6 Increasing rewards for a win
Another contemplated change to the incentives facing NHL teams is to give a winning team three
points for a regulation win as opposed to two. Such a change in the point structure has been
implemented in most professional soccer leagues. One version of the reward system would give a
team three points for a win in regulation, two for a win in overtime, one for a tie or an overtime loss,
and zero for a loss in regulation. The intent of such a change is to create a more attacking style of
game since teams would be rewarded for doing better and trying to win in regulation rather than
play conservatively and settle for a guaranteed one point arising from a tie in regulation (Mullin, J
(2003)).
To analyze how such a proposed rule change would a⁄ect team strategies, we will use the model
developed above. We de￿ne the end of play payo⁄ UregA of team A as,
Ureg
A = 2(I fZT > 0g ￿ I fZT < 0g) +
1
2
I fZT = 0g
where I f:g is the indicator function and the expected payo⁄ from tieing a regulation time game is
1
2:
13Team B￿ s end of play payo⁄ will be
Ureg
B = 2(I fZT < 0g ￿ I fZT > 0g) +
1
2
I fZT = 0g
We can then derive the expected payo⁄ of Team A as
E
￿
Ureg
A￿
= 2
T X
d=1
[Pr(ZT = d) ￿ Pr(ZT = ￿d)] +
1
2
Pr(ZT = 0)
and for Team B,
E
￿
Ureg
B￿
= 2
T X
d=1
[Pr(ZT = d) ￿ Pr(ZT = ￿d)] +
1
2
Pr(ZT = 0)
where the probabilities are calculated as in (4.10).
Let us look at the example 4 in the previous section and see how the same teams will fare under
the proposed rules.
Example 5 Let (p(H;H);p(H;L);p(L;H);p(L;L)) = (1
4; 1
12; 1
16; 1
20). Considering the in￿nitely
divisible overtime game under the new rule we have ￿ = 1
2:Note that the comparative advantage of
playing o⁄ensive hockey is ￿ = p(H;L)￿p(L;H) = 1
48 > 0: Using lemma (3) or the Markov equations
(4.10) we obtain the expected payo⁄ matrix of Team A and B as:
sB￿sA H,H,H H,H,L H,L,H L,H,H H,L,L L,H,L L,L,H L,L,L
H,H,H (0.16,0.16) (0.2,0.15) (0.2,0.15) (0.2,0.15) (0.28,0.16) (0.28,0.16) (0.28,0.16) (0.43,0.22)
H,H,L (0.15,0.2) (0.18,0.18) (0.22,0.22) (0.22,0.22) (0.25,0.19) (0.25,0.19) (0.36,0.29) (0.41,0.27)
H,L,H (0.15,0.2) (0.22,0.22) (0.18,0.18) (0.22,0.22) (0.25,0.19) (0.36,0.29) (0.25,0.19) (0.41,0.27)
L,H,H (0.15,0.2) (0.22,0.22) (0.22,0.22) (0.18,0.18) (0.36,0.29) (0.25,0.19) (0.25,0.19) (0.41,0.27)
H,L,L (0.16,0.28) (0.19,0.25) (0.19,0.25) (0.29,0.36) (0.23,0.23) (0.34,0.34) (0.34,0.34) (0.39,0.32)
L,H,L (0.16,0.28) (0.19,0.25) (0.29,0.36) (0.19,0.25) (0.34,0.34) (0.23,0.23) (0.34,0.34) (0.39,0.32)
L,L,H (0.16,0.28) (0.29,0.36) (0.19,0.25) (0.19,0.25) (0.34,0.34) (0.34,0.34) (0.23,0.23) (0.39,0.32)
L,L,L (0.22,0.43) (0.27,0.41) (0.27,0.41) (0.27,0.41) (0.32,0.39) (0.32,0.39) (0.32,0.39) (0.37,0.37)
Clearly Team A (or B) will not play (H;H;H) as deviating to (L;L;L) yields a better payo⁄.
This example shows that the change in the rewards to a regulation time win will not be su¢ cient
to stimulate more o⁄ensive play for some teams. In other words, while increasing the rewards for a
win in regulation time may stimulate more o⁄ensive play for some teams, it will not fully o⁄set the
negative incentive e⁄ects caused by the introduction of the new overtime rule. For at least some of
the teams, the negative incentive e⁄ects of the overtime rules changes in 2000 are stranger than any
positive e⁄ects from increasing the rewards for regulation time victories from 2 to 3 points. The
incentives for some of the teams will still be to play defensively in regulation time to capture the
point from a tie after 60 minutes of play and hope to get an extra point in overtime.
147 Concluding comments
Institutional reforms a⁄ect behavior, but not always in the way intended. Recent studies analyzing
the e⁄ect of rule changes on strategic behavior in sporting competitions yield interesting insights.
They are particularly interesting because due to the very nature of the sporting competitions many
external factors which typically in￿ uence behavior are controlled for, or excluded.
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of the recent introduction of a rule change in the
National Hockey League on the strategies of hockey teams. The NHL decreed that as of the 1999-
2000 season, in case of a tie after the regulation time, both teams would get one point each; and that
the winner in overtime would get an additional point. This change rewarded the teams which tied
in regulation time but lost in overtime with a point which they did not get under the old rules. The
rule change was intended to enhance the general appeal of the game by stimulating more o⁄ensive
play in regulation time. Our analysis shows that this was a correct assumption. We demonstrate
with our theoretical model that teams are more likely to play o⁄ensively in overtime under the new
rule. The empirical evidence we present con￿rms these conclusions.
These ￿ndings appears to provide strong support for the NHL￿ s decision to introduce the 1999
rule change. However, such conclusion is not justi￿ed, since it is based on an incomplete analysis.
The rule change also has another, unintended, impact. Our theoretical analysis shows how the rule
change has a perverse e⁄ect on team strategies in regulation time, causing more defensive play during
the main part of the game. The empirical evidence provides support for this conclusion. Hence the
conclusions based on the full e⁄ects of the rule change should be less positive, and more nuanced.
A series of additional rule changes to o⁄set the perverse regulation time e⁄ect are being considered.
The most prominent proposal is to raise the reward for the winning team to 3 points and keep the
rest the same. In the last section of the paper we show that this proposal, if implemented, may
mitigate the perverse e⁄ect in regulation time, but will not eliminate it. In fact, there will still be
more defensive play in regulation time under the proposed rule changes than if the 1999 rule change
would be eliminated and one would reverse to the pre 1999 rule system.
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Appendix:
Proof of Lemmas:
Proof of Lemma 1 : By de￿nition (3.2),
E
￿
Uold
A
T
￿
= Pr(WT = 1) ￿ Pr(WT = ￿1)
Notice that,
Pr(WT = 1) =
T X
t=1
Pr(Xt = 1; Xt0 = 0 8 t
0 < t)
=
T X
t=1
Pr(Xt = 1)
Y
t02￿t￿1
Pr( Xt0 = 0)
=
T X
t=1
p
￿
s
A
t ;s
B
t
￿
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿
(7.12)
Similarly
Pr(WT = ￿1) =
T X
t=1
q
￿
s
A
t ;s
B
t
￿
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿￿t￿1
￿
: (7.13)
Combining (7.12) and (7.13) we get
E
￿
Uold
A
T
￿
=
T X
t=1
￿
p
￿
s
A
t ;s
B
t
￿
￿ q
￿
s
A
t ;s
B
t
￿￿
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿
:
Proof of Lemma 2: Follows from (7.12) of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 3: By de￿nition it follows that
E
￿
Ureg
A
T
￿
= Pr(ZT > 0) ￿ Pr(ZT < 0) + ￿Pr(ZT = 0)
=
T X
d=1
Pr(ZT = d) ￿ Pr(ZT = ￿d) + ￿Pr(ZT = 0)
16De￿ne a partition of N = f1;:::;Tg as T1 = ft : Xt = 1g;T2 = ft : Xt = ￿1g and T3 = ft : Xt = 0g:
Then jT1j is the number of goals scored by team A and jT2j is the number of goals scored by team
B. So if jT1j ￿ jT2j = d, team A wins by d goals. Notice that T1;T2 and T3; is an arbitrary partition
of N; so team A can win by d goals with any such partition as long asjT1j ￿ jT2j = d.
Using the notation de￿ned in (3) the probability that team A scores at times t 2 T1 and team B
scores (team A concedes a goal) at times t 2 T2; as
Pr(Xt2T1;Xt2T2;Xt2T3) = P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
(7.14)
Hence the game ending with d goals can be written as the sum of all such terms in (7.14) as long as
thejT1j ￿ jT2j = d:Therefore
Pr(ZT = d) =
T￿d X
k=0
X
T3:T￿jT1j+jT2j
X
T1:jT1j=k+d
X
T2:jT2j=k
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
=
X
T3;T1;T2:jT1j￿jT2j=d
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿T1
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿T2
￿
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿
￿T3
￿
:
where T1;T2 and T3 is a partition of N: Similarly (notice that team A now loses by d goals)
Pr(ZT = ￿d) =
X
T3;T1;T2:jT1j￿jT2j=d
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
and
Pr(ZT = 0) =
X
T3;T1;T2:jT1j=jT2j
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
Hence,
T X
d=1
[Pr(ZT = d) ￿ Pr(ZT = ￿d)] ￿ ￿Pr(ZT = 0)
=
T X
d=1
X
T3;T1;T2:jT1j￿jT2j=d
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
￿ ￿
X
T3;T1;T2:jT1j=jT2j
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T3
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T2
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
B￿ ￿T1
￿
Proof of Theorems:
Proof of Theorem 1:
a) Given p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H) = ￿ > 0 and H
ﬂ
=(H;:::;H):We prove the theorem in two parts
1) (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) is an equilibrium and
2) Any other pair of strategies (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
) are not equilibrium strategies.
Let s
ﬂ
A be the strategy vector with sA
t0 = L and sA
t = H 8 t 6= t0 Team A will then deviate at
time t0; if
V old
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
￿ V old
A
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) > 0
17>From (1) we know that Vw (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) = 0; for any s
ﬂ
. So team A deviates if
V old
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
> 0
Notice that
V old
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
=
T X
t=1
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿￿
p
￿
s
A
t ;H
￿
￿ q
￿
s
A
t ;H
￿￿
=
T X
t=1;t6=t0
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿
(p(H;H) ￿ q (H;H))
+ R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿￿t0￿1
￿
(p(L;H) ￿ q (L;H))
= R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
￿￿t0￿1
￿
p(L;H) ￿ q (L;H) (by (3.3))
= R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿￿t0￿1
￿
p(L;H) ￿ p(H;L) (by (3.3))
= ￿￿R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿￿t0￿1
￿
So there is a negative payo⁄ for deviation and therefore team A does not deviate. The same holds
for team B. If the teams want to deviate at multiple time points ft1;:::;tkg;there is also a negative
payo⁄, the proof of which is similar as above.
Hence (H
ﬂ
,H
ﬂ
) is an equilibrium.
Secondly, we need to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium. As the payo⁄ matrix is skew
symmetric the there is no asymmetric equilibrium. So any equilibrium must be of the form (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
):
We shall show that if s
ﬂ
6= H
ﬂ
, there is a positive payo⁄ for team A to deviate.
If s
ﬂ
6= H
ﬂ
, then 9 t0 s:t st0 = L:
Let team A deviate at t0; and plays H: Let s
ﬂ
A be the strategy vector with sA
t0 = L and sA
t = st8
t 6= t0: Then
V old
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿
=
T X
t=1
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿
￿￿t￿1
￿￿
p
￿
s
A
t ;st
￿
￿ q
￿
s
A
t ;st
￿￿
=
T X
t=1;t6=t0
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿
(p(st;st) ￿ q (st;st))
+ R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿ ￿￿t0￿1
￿
(p(H;L) ￿ q (H;L))
= 0 + R(s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
j￿t0￿1)(p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H))
= ￿R(s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
j￿t0￿1) > 0
Hence team A will deviate. The same holds for team B. Therefore (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
) is not an equilibrium strategy
pair. Hence (H
ﬂ
,H
ﬂ
) is an unique equilibrium.
b) If ￿ < 0; then (L
ﬂ
;L
ﬂ
) will be the only equilibrium. Proof is similar as a)
c) since the payo⁄ matrix is skew symmetric the value of the game is zero.
18Proof of Theorem 2. Let s
ﬂ
A be the strategy vector with sA
t0 = L and sA
t = H 8 t 6= t0 Team A
will not deviate at time t0; if V newA
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) > V newA
T
￿
sA
t0;H
ﬂ
￿
. Consider
V new
A
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) =
T X
t=1
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿￿t￿1
￿
p(H;H)
V new
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
=
Pt0
t=1 R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
j￿t￿1)p(H;H) + p(L;H)R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
j￿t0￿1)
+
PT
t=t0+1 R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
j￿t￿1n(t0))p(H;H)r(L;H)
therefore subtracting,
V new
A
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) ￿ V new
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
= (p(H;H) ￿ p(L;H))R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
j￿t0￿1)
+(r(H;H) ￿ r(L;H))p(H;H)
T X
t=t0+1
R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
j￿t￿1n(t0))
=
￿
((p(H;H) ￿ p(L;H))) + (r(H;H) ￿ r(L;H))p(H;H)
1 ￿ r(H;H)T￿t0+1
1 ￿ r(H;H)
￿
r(H;H)
t0￿1
since r(H;H)t0￿1 is positive we need to consider only
p(H;H)(r(H;H) ￿ r(L;H))
T￿t0 X
t=1
r(H;H) + (p(H;H) ￿ p(L;H))
= p(H;H)(r(H;H) ￿ r(L;H))
1 ￿ r(H;H)T￿t0+1
1 ￿ r(H;H)
+ (p(H;H) ￿ p(L;H))
= (r(H;H) ￿ r(L;H))
1
2
￿
1 ￿ r(H;H)
T￿t0+1￿
+ (p(H;H) ￿ p(L;H))
=(p(H;H) ￿ p(L;H)) ￿
￿
1 ￿ r(H;H)
T￿t0+1￿ 1
2
(2p(H;H) ￿ p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H))
= (p(H;H) ￿ p(L;H)) ￿
￿
1 ￿ r(H;H)
T￿t0+1￿
￿
p(H;H) ￿
p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H)
2
￿
= (p(H;H) ￿ p(L;H)) ￿
￿
1 ￿ r(H;H)
T￿t0+1￿￿
p(H;H) ￿
p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H)
2
￿
=
￿
p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H)
2
￿
+ r(H;H)
T￿t0+1
￿
p(H;H) ￿
p(H;L) + p(L;H)
2
￿
The above expression is positive since ￿ > 0; and (2.1). Since Team B is symmetric to Team A the
same will hold for them, hence, sA = H
ﬂ
and team B sB = H
ﬂ
is the equilibrium.
b) If team A has a comparative advantage of playing in o⁄ensively (￿ > 0), we know (from part
a)) that under the new rules that (H
ﬂ
,H
ﬂ
) is an unique equilibrium for all T: Therefore, the expected
utility of Team A at T is
V new
A
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) = p(H;H)
1 ￿ r(H;H)T
1 ￿ r(H;H)
:
Hence limT!1 V newA
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) =
p(H;H)
1￿r(H;H) = 1
2: The proof is same for Team B.
19Proof of Theorem 3:
a) Given p(H;L) ￿ p(L;H) = ￿ > 0; ￿ = 0 and H
ﬂ
=(H;:::;H): We prove the theorem in two
parts that
1. (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) is an equilibrium and
2. Any other pair of strategies (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
) are not equilibrium strategies.
Let s
ﬂ
A be the strategy vector with sA
t0 = L and sA
t = H 8 t 6= t0 Team A will then deviate at
time t0; if
V reg
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
￿ V reg
A
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) > 0
>From (3) we know that V regA
T (H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
) = 0; for any s
ﬂ
. So Team A deviates if
V reg
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
> 0 (7.15)
Notice that for any given partition of N : T1;T2 and T3,
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T1
￿
= P (H;HjT1nft0g)p(L;H) if t0 2 T1 (7.16)
= P (H;HjT1) if t0 62 T1
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T2
￿
= P (H;HjT2nft0g)qL;Hif t0 2 T2 (7.17)
= P (H;HjT2) if t0 62 T2
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿
￿T3
￿
= R(H;HjT3) if t0 2 T1 [ T2 (7.18)
= R(H;HjT3nft0g)r(L;H) if t0 2 T3
Let us look at the contributions of individual terms on the summation of V regA
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
T X
d=1
X
T3;T1;T2:jT1j￿jT2j=d
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T3
￿
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
If t0 2 T3; then R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T3
￿
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
= 0; since
D(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
jT1;T2) = P (H
ﬂ
;HjT1)Q(H
ﬂ
;HjT2) ￿ Q(H
ﬂ
;HjT1)P (H
ﬂ
;HjT2)
= 0
by (3.3).
The next step we consider the terms where t0 2 T2; then
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
￿T1;T2
￿
= P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿
￿T1
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿
￿T2
￿
￿ Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T1
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T2
￿
= P (H;HjT1)Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T2
￿
￿ Q(H;HjT1)P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T2
￿
=
P (H;HjT1)Q(H;HjT2nft0g)q (L;H)
￿Q(H;HjT1)P (H;HjT2nft0g)p(L;H)
= P (H;HjT1 [ T2 ￿ ft0g)(q (L;H) ￿ p(L;H))
20Notice that since jT1j = jT2j + d; then jT1j must be at least d = 1;:::;T. So let t1 2 T1: Construct
T 0
1 = T1 [ ft0gnft1g and T 0
2 = T2 [ ft1gnft0g: Notice that T 0
1;T 0
2 and T 0
3 is a partition such that
jT 0
1j = jT 0
2j + d and T 0
3 = T3 therefore
R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
jT3) = R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
jT
0
3)
and
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
￿T
0
1;T
0
2
￿
= P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿
￿T
0
1
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿
￿T
0
2
￿
￿ Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿
￿T
0
1
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿
￿T
0
2
￿
=
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿
￿T1 [ ft0gnft1g
￿
Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T2 [ ft1gnft0g
￿
￿Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T1 [ ft0gnft1g
￿
P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T2 [ ft1gnft0g
￿
=
P (H;HjT1nft1g)p(L;H)P (H;HjT2 [ ft1gnft0g)
￿P (H;HjT1nft1g)q (L;H)P (H;HjT2 [ ft1gnft0g)
= P (H;HjT1 [ T2nft0g)(p(L;H) ￿ q (L;H))
= ￿D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
Hence,
R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
jT
0
3)D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T
0
1;T
0
2
￿
+ R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
jT3)D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
= 0;
the terms will cancel each other. There will be no positive contribution to the payo⁄ due to change
of strategy by team A.
The next case is when t0 2 T1: We will also show this in two parts.
Part 1: when for a given d; jT1j > d; then jT2j > 0; so that as in case of the proof above (case
of t0 2 T2) we have T 0
1 = T1 [ ft0gnft1g and T 0
2 = T2 [ ft1gnft0g where t1 2 T2; and show that
R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
jT3)D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
= ￿R(H
ﬂ
;H
ﬂ
jT 0
3)D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T 0
1;T 0
2
￿
: Therefore, the terms cancel again.
There is no positive contributions by these terms to the payo⁄ of team A.
Part 2: when given jT1j = d (notice d > 1); then T2 = ;
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;;
￿
= P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T1
￿
￿ Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T1
￿
= P (H;HjT1nft0g)(pL;H ￿ qL;H)
= ￿￿P (H;HjT1nft0g)
so this term contributes a negative amount if ￿ > 0. Adding up all the terms we have,
V reg
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
< 0:
So there is a negative payo⁄ for deviation and therefore team A does not deviate. The same holds
for team B. If the teams want to deviate at multiple time points ft1;:::;tkg;there is also a negative
payo⁄, the proof of which is similar as above.
Hence (H
ﬂ
,H
ﬂ
) is an equilibrium.
Now we show the second part of the proof : any other pair of strategies (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
) are not equilibrium
strategies.
21Let s
ﬂ
A be the strategy vector with sA
t0 = L and sA
t = H 8 t 6= t0 Team A will then deviate at
time t0; if
V reg
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿
￿ V reg
A
T (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
) > 0
>From (3) we know that V regA
T (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
) = 0; for any s
ﬂ
. So team A deviates if V regA
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿
> 0 and
then any other pair of strategies (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
) are not equilibrium strategies.
By using similar logic as the proof in part a) we look at the contributions of each individual terms
on the summation of V regA
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿
T X
d=1
X
T1;T2:jT1j￿jT2j=d
R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿ ￿T3
￿
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
If t0 2 T3; then R
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿ ￿T3
￿
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
= 0; since D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;s
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;T2
￿
= 0:
Similar to the proof in part a) if t0 2 T2;there will be zero contribution to the deviation due to
change of strategy by team A. Also if t0 2 T1 and jT1j > d; there will be a zero contribution. The
only case where there is a non-zero contribution is the case where t0 2 T1 and jT1j = d: Then, for
each d (Case 2 in part 1),
D
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿ ￿T1;;
￿
= P
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T1
￿
￿ Q
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
￿ ￿T1
￿
= P (H;HjT1nft0g)(pH;L ￿ qH;L)
= ￿P (H;HjT1nft0g) > 0
if ￿ > 0. Therefore, again adding up all the terms we have,
V reg
A
T
￿
s
ﬂ
A;H
ﬂ
￿
> 0:
and team A deviates from L to H at time t0: The same holds for team B. So (s
ﬂ
;s
ﬂ
) is not an
equilibrium strategy pair. Hence (H
ﬂ
,H
ﬂ
) is a unique equilibrium.
b) If ￿ < 0; then (L
ﬂ
;L
ﬂ
) will be the only equilibrium. The proof is similar as a)
228 Tables:
Season 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00￿￿ 00-01 01-02 02-03
# of Teams 26 26 26 27 28 30 30 30
# of Games Played 1066 1066 1066 1107 1148 1230 1230 1230
# of Overtimes Played 201 214 219 222 260 261 263 307
% of All Games
Going into Overtime
19.9 20.1 20.5 20.1 22.6 21.2 21.4 25.0
# of Overtime Wins 64 70 54 60 114 122 119 154
% of Overtime Wins
to Overtime Played
31.8 32.7 24.7 27.0 43.8 46.7 45.2 50.2
**Year of overtime rule change.
Table 1: Number and Results of Overtime Games in NHL, 1995-2003.
Season Total Same Conference Di⁄erent Conference Z Test Statistic
1995-1996 31.8 _
1996-1997 32.7 30.9 35.5 -0.67
1997-1998 24.7 29.9 14.9 2.41
1998-1999 27.0 24.3 28.3 -0.64
1999-2000 43.8 42.5 43.5 -0.15
2000-2001 46.7 45.4 50.0 -0.70
2001-2002 45.2 44.0 50.0 -0.92
2002-2003 50.2 49.1 52.9 -0.63
Table 2: Percentage of Overtime Games Ending in a Win by Conference, 1995-2003,
23Variables Coe¢ cient Standard Error
New OT Rule 0.713* 0.118
Conference -0.001 0.103
Salary Sum 0.0035 0.002
Salary Di⁄erence -0.0031* 0.005
RLR Chi-Sq = 71.45
* Statistically signi￿cant at 5%
Table 3: Logit Regression Results of Likelihood of Goal Being Scored in an Overtime Game
24